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ENGLISH AND THE LATIN QUESTION¹

There is a popular rumor abroad, which threatens to become an article of faith, to the effect that the only persons seriously concerned for the future of Latin studies are the teachers of Latin and certain amiable old gentlemen who received their education before Darwin announced the Origin of Species. The prosperity of this rumor is partly to be explained by the fact that the believers in Latin have too persistently stood upon the defensive; so that to the eyes of an indiscriminating and not over-interested public they have appeared always to be fighting for their own altars and their own fires. They have demanded, on the one hand, a unique place in the curriculum on the ground that Latin literature possesses a unique and immediate humanizing value. On the other hand, they have stood upon the preëminent virtue of Latin as a formal intellectual discipline. The objection to entire dependence upon these two positions is that they are exposed to constant and violent assault; though they may be impregnable, they are by no means indisputable. As an agent of culture, Latin has been

¹ Reprinted from School and Home Education, for April, 1912. The author is Professor of English in the University of Illinois. This article is so important, coming as it does from one who is not concerned primarily with the Classics, or at least has no direct professional interest in the Classics, that we gladly reproduce it in this and the next issue in place of the usual editorials. Mr. Sherman, to be sure, overlooks the fact that advocates of the Classics have long insisted on some of the very things on which he so well insists: compare e.g. Professor Harrington's book, *Live Issues in Classical Study*, noticed in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 4.169-170. Advocates of the Classics, again, have long urged that for various reasons they ought to find ardent allies, e.g. in the supporters of French, and in the lovers of English literature. Nay, among the teachers of German, too, we ought to find warm supporters, if for no other reason, out of gratitude, for the birth of a true German literature and the intellectual dominance of Germany in the nineteenth century were both due to the contact of Germany with Greek literature at the close of the eighteenth century. But such appeals from the friends of the Classics it has been easy to disregard as born of self-interest. Mr. Sherman's paper, therefore, is most welcome, because here we have the proposal of alliance coming not from us but from others, from others, too, whose competition with the Classics in times past helped to deprive the Classics of their privileged position. It is refreshing to see increasing evidences of a realization of the disastrous effects on the study of English of disregard of the Classics. Reference may be made here to THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 2.89-90 (an editorial discussion of some remarks by a professor of English on the impossibility of understanding English literature without a knowledge of the Classics, with a quotation from an editorial of the New York Times on the futility of trying to understand the Classics in translations). Again, in THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 3.73 will be found some reference to a circular issued in September 1908, by Charles Mills Gayley and William A. Merrill, Professors respectively of English and of Latin in the University of California, appealing to teachers of English and of Latin to foster the study of Greek as an indispensable part of the proper preparation of teachers of English and of Latin. See also 4.113, 161-162. C. K.

obliged to struggle for a foothold with jealous rivals ranging from economic history to nature-study and wood-carving. As an agent of discipline, it has been hard pressed by physics and mathematics. And now comes the psychologist educator, and offers to cut that ground from underfoot by denying assent to the 'dogma of formal discipline'.

It is possible at the present hour that the Capitoline Hill may best be defended by leaving it, and by joining forces with the allies outside the city; I mean, by ceasing for a time to insist upon the independent value of Latin, and by concentrating attention upon its value in relation to other studies—particularly English. The strategic advantage of the shift would rise from the fact that English is now very strongly intrenched in both secondary and college education. Furthermore, we are all—more or less deliberately—students of English; we all recognize the value of accurately expressing our ideas and of exactly understanding the ideas of others. Now, though the notion has never dawned upon that large, good-humored, unenlightened public opinion which indirectly shapes our educational policies, to the serious student of English some acquaintance with Latin is not merely convenient, not merely valuable, but quite literally indispensable. At every onward step toward the mastery of his own language and literature he must use his Latin lamp if he has one, or stumble and go astray in the darkness if he has not. In this position the value of Latin is unique. To propose the equivalence of economic history or nature-study or wood-carving or physics or mathematics is sheer impertinence. The reasons why this is so impressively impinge upon one's consciousness only after one has been dealing for some time with students of English who have no Latin. I speak not as a Roman citizen but as a provincial ally, who sees that the safety and perpetuity of our provincial institutions is bound up with security of Rome.

II

We grant Latin readily enough to grammarians and lexicographers, but are rather reluctant to admit that it is a key which should be in the hands of every one who has occasion to open an English dictionary. Yet we know that the invasion of Latin words into English speech began nearly 2,000 years ago, and has continued with unabated vigor ever since. It has been estimated by competent investi-

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gators that one fourth of the Latin vocabulary has passed into English¹. Of these Latin words a very large number have come in without change of form, and some of them still retain their original inflections. We must give our students an inkling of Latin grammar before we can expect them to employ correctly such common forms as *data*, *strata*, and the like. Besides this group, we have an immense host of naturalized foreigners derived directly from the Latin and indirectly through the Romance languages. In the Bible and Shakespeare only 60 per cent of the vocabulary is of native stock; in the poetry of Milton, only 33 per cent². The great bulk of the remainder is of Latin origin. The technical language of philosophy, theology, law, and the sciences—constantly growing and constantly overflowing into the language of everyday life—is mainly Latin. In the time of Chaucer, French and Latin were rival forces in the introduction of new elements into our speech, but since the Renaissance far the greater number of the new coins have come from the Roman treasury. In one sense, then, Latin is even less a dead language than English. It is the element in our composite vocabulary which has shown, as compared with Anglo-Saxon, the more abundant powers of growth and reproduction. It is almost as fairly to be called our father as English is to be called our mother tongue.

But why attack this Latin element in English by way of the Latin grammar and the Latin lexicon? How specifically does the study of Latin facilitate the use of Latin words which have become English? Well, three or four years of Latin will acquaint the student with the original force of most of the prefixes and suffixes, and so guard him from some of the commonest improprieties, and even, if he has any instinct for these things, assist him materially in the art and mystery of English spelling. Furthermore, his possession of merely the simplest and most limited Latin vocabulary will give him a great advantage over a student without Latin in approaching the apparently formidable English polysyllables. To the man without Latin our sesquipedalian abstracts remain impenetrably abstract; to the man with Latin they disintegrate into their physical elements. To the one, words like *fratricide* and *matricide*, for examples, look strange, learned, and difficult. To the other, who has met *frater*, *mater*, and *caedere* in the Latin lexicon, *fratricide* looks easy and familiar—just as *Brudermord* looks easy and familiar to a German. A modest grasp of Latin, then, does indeed unlock the difficult words in English. And it helps not merely in acquiring them but also in retaining them and in employing them

with assurance and accuracy. This is no negligible consideration; nothing so obstinately balks the progress of our English students in reading and in writing as the short tether at the end of which they rotate around the English dictionary.

It is often urged that the meaning of English words of Latin derivation has so changed that a knowledge of the roots is practically valueless—that the meanings may better be learned directly from English usage. This is a particularly pernicious error. In this fashion our lighter-hearted journalists acquire their mother tongue. This is the easy and rapid method for the corruption of speech—the means by which all fineness of shading and nicety of application are lost. This is why we find students and journalists saying *aggravate* for *irritate*, *stupendous* for *immense*, *amazing* for *remarkable*, *splendid* for *delicious*, *redolent* for *full of*, *supine* for *prone*, *ardent* for *energetic*, *optimistic* for *amiable*, etc.—indefinitely. Coleridge declared that the first thing to consider in the choice of a word is its root; and he was right. No writer or speaker who ignores the roots of Latin derivatives is secure from egregious error. Some years ago the post office department, for example, sent out directions that all letters of a certain class should be *endorsed* on the face of the envelope³. The physical image buried in these words is galvanized into an awkward activity by the grasp of an unskillful hand. Just as truly, there is a sleeping beauty in them ready to waken at the touch of the prince of style. But there is no prince of style in English who has not given days and nights to the study of Latin; and I do not believe there ever will be. It is a condition imposed upon us by the wealth of our word-hoard. It is a burden and a privilege committed to us by innumerable ancestors, which we must sustain under peril of forfeiting our inheritance.

III

When we pass from the consideration of vocabulary and style to the consideration of English literature in general, the necessity of Latin becomes even more obvious. Merely in passing, it may be recalled that for nearly a thousand years Englishmen wrote in Latin a very large body of their history, their philosophy, their religious and their political thought. Every one knows that in the Anglo-Saxon and mediaeval periods Latin-trained monks and churchmen were the English scholars, and that the works which they thought worth preserving were mainly addressed to the Latin-reading world in the language of that world. It is not so generally remembered how far down toward our own day poets and prose writers continued to some extent the serious use of Latin in original composition. It is a good penitential exercise for a modernist to run

¹ Greenough and Kittredge, *Words and their Ways in English Speech*, 1901; see p. 106.

² Marsh, *Lectures on the English Language*, Ed. 4; see p. 123.

³ Krapp, *Modern English*, 1909; see p. 282.

over from time to time some of these names: in Anglo-Saxon times, Bede for church history, Anselm for theology and philosophy; in the twelfth century, Geoffrey of Monmouth for the origins of Arthurian romance,—and a whole troop of Latin chroniclers; Roger Bacon for philosophy in the thirteenth century; Matthew Paris for history; John Gower for poetry in the age of Chaucer, Wycliff's earlier writings for divinity; in the sixteenth century, More's *Utopia*, and poetry like that of the great Scotch humanist, George Buchanan, and Shakespeare's contemporary Thomas Campion; in the seventeenth, the more serious scientific work of Lord Bacon, a flood of occasional verse, some of the prose and poetry of Milton, poetical, political, and philosophical works of Hobbes; and so it continues down toward the end of the eighteenth century in the Latin poems of Vincent Bourne and Thomas Gray. It does not concern the 'man in the street' or even the ordinary student to read this matter in Latin or, indeed, to read most of it at all. It does concern the scholar frequently. And in it are some of the most interesting and the darkest spots of our literary history.

Yet let the intrinsic value of this great body of Anglo-Latin literature be rated as low as one pleases, there it lies behind us like a sunken Roman wall stretching from our immediate past across the wide tract of the middle ages to the uttermost borders and beginnings of English thought—an imperishable reminder of our intimate and age-long alliance with that elder culture and speech, under the shadow and protection of which our own speech and culture have developed. To itemize our indebtedness to that great alliance is impossible. It is equally impossible, moreover, to exaggerate it. Though our English authors have now at last ceased to entrust to Latin any ideas which they wish the world to consider, every great English writer of prose or poetry from the time of King Alfred to the time of Alfred Tennyson has—almost without exception—been schooled in the Latin language, has known well some of the Latin masterpieces, and, consciously or not, willingly or not, has written under the influence, sometimes indistinct, sometimes overmastering, of the Latin models.

King Alfred tells us that upon a time he fell awondering why in the good old days when Latin learning flourished in England none of the scholars had bethought themselves of turning anything into their own language. "But straightway", says the old king, "I answered my thought in this wise: They did not conceive that men were ever to become so careless; that learning was ever so to decline"! In the dearth of the higher education, however, the king hastens to give his people the second-best, an English translation of the *Pastoral Care*, discreetly following the Latin—"just as I learned it from Plegmund my archbishop, and from Asser my bishop,

and from Grimbold my mass-priest, and from John my mass-priest". And so, following the humility of this well-disciplined sovereign, all the Middle Ages sit at the feet of ancient Rome, great schoolmistress of the mediaeval world. For Chaucer and his contemporaries, with all their freshness of observation, literary composition still consists in great measure in retelling classical story, in retailing classical thought. In the Renaissance, translation and imitation receive new impetus from closer contact with the best models; and a whole generation of writers tries to classicize English thought, and style, and vocabulary, and even English prosody. In the seventeenth century, religious poets are still plundering Ovid to express their love for God and the Virgin, and a prose writer so late as Sir Thomas Browne declares that "if elegance still proceedeth, and English pens maintain that stream we have of late observed to flow from many, we shall within a few years be fain to learn Latin to understand English, and a work will prove of equal facility in either". Just as the sonorous and golden prose of men like Drummond of Hawthornden, Browne, and Jeremy Taylor betrays the potent spell of Cicero and the Roman eloquence, so typical eighteenth century poetry acknowledges the sway of Horace; and his odes, epistles, and *Ars Poetica* are edited, translated, parodied, and imitated by hundreds—perhaps by thousands. In the nineteenth century the influence of Latin models becomes possibly more diffuse but scarcely less persistent. Cardinal Newman, whom we recognize as a genuine representative of classical English in an age when Carlylese flourishes, has undergone the discipline of all the Roman prose masters, and can discourse learnedly of their several qualities. Tennyson professes himself a lover of Vergil since his days began, echoes ever and anon the "Lydian laughter" of Catullus, or tunes his graver harp to the solemn music of Lucretius. The stylist Stevenson studies Tacitus and reads his Livy amid the tempest of the South Pacific Sea. Nor does the story end there. I have heard of an editor who chastens his style for the morning's editorial by an hour before breakfast with a Roman historian. Eugene Field adapts Horace to the meridian of Chicago. In a recent article we hear of Mark Twain's well-thumbed copy of Suetonius, which he read till his very last day; on page 492, "there is a reference to 'Flavius Clemens, a man of wide repute for his want of energy', opposite which Mark Twain writes in the margin—'I guess this is where our line starts'". Mark Twain's strong common sense does not fail him, where many professional educators stumble. Our line does start there, or thereabouts!

STUART P. SHERMAN.

¹ Cited in the historical introduction to the *International Dictionary*, p. xxxiv (1901).

(To be concluded.)

A FUNCTION OF THE CLASSICAL EXORDIUM

The exordium of the classical speech, which called for separate and full treatment in the ancient rhetoricians, is passed over practically without comment in modern books of rhetoric. At first rhetoric treated exclusively of the spoken word; now it is confined almost wholly to the written word, except in the case of those books that still continue the traditions of the art of eloquence. Students of the Classics, however, cannot well afford to ignore the old rhetoric and its precepts, and it is a pleasing feature of most of the recent editions of Cicero's *Orations* that the general outlines of each speech, as laid down in rhetoric, have been embodied in the introductions or the notes. The present paper, which attempts to clarify the functions of the exordium, may help on this good cause.

The exordium from time immemorial had a triple function to perform: *reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles*, as the Latins put it. The first two functions, gaining the goodwill of the audience and winning its attention, by removing prejudices against the speaker or his cause and by dwelling on the importance or the advantages or the novelty of his topic, have been pretty well understood, but the third function, which has been styled making the hearers *docile*, has not been as clearly grasped. For this fact there are two main reasons. First, the English word *docile* has taken on associations which were not in the Latin word *docilis*; much less were they contained in the Greek original. In the second place, the meaning of *docilis* is so obvious and so simple, and this function of the exordium is so plainly taken for granted that it would almost seem unnecessary to notice it. Why mention the obvious fact that a man should say what he is talking about, or why give any precepts about it? Yet the principal thing an orator does when he makes his hearers *dociles* is to tell them the topic of his discourse.

Anaximenes, if he is the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, is one of the first to mention the three functions distinctly; he states that the orator performs the duty of making his hearers *dociles*, if he simply says, 'I arise for the purpose of advising that we should wage war in behalf of the Syracusans', or 'I arise in order to show that we ought not to send aid to the Syracusans' (Chapter 29). This is indeed a very simple case, and in connection with it the intellectual preparation of the audience did not call for much elaboration. But as a rule the function in question did not involve much more than the brief and clear statement of the subject to be discussed, with an indication perhaps of the parts into which the discussion was to be divided and a hint at the way the topic was to be handled. It will be evident, therefore, why Aristotle

called this function the most necessary of the three and the only essential one (see below, page 205). Unfortunately, some modern rhetoricians have given to the term meanings it never had, and some commentators on Aristotle, because of a false interpretation of a not very clear sentence, have made a further mystery of a simple term. These are the reasons which justify a fairly complete statement of the history of the terms *docilitas* and *docilis*. In our discussion the Latin term has usually been kept because of the ambiguity of the English word *docile*.

Blair, in Lecture 31 of his *Rhetoric*, speaking of the ends or purposes of an introduction or exordium, says: "The third end is to render the hearers docile, or open to persuasion, for which end we must begin by studying to remove any particular prepossessions they may have contracted against the cause or side of the argument which we espouse".

This statement has been embodied in other books of rhetoric and is responsible in a great measure for a misconception of the original meaning of this well-known rhetorical term (a recent rhetorician renders it by the English word 'submissive'). Originally *docilis* referred to a purely intellectual preparation of the audience, had none of the associations of our English word *docile*, which describes in most of its uses a moral quality of the will, and had nothing to do with "particular prepossessions contracted against the cause".

What is the evidence to show that Blair misses the correct meaning of the term? It may be grouped under three heads: (1) the Greek rhetoricians, (2) the Latin rhetoricians, and (3) the more recent rhetoricians.

(1) *The Greek Rhetoricians*.—The triple function of the exordium antedates Aristotle. The original inventor of the term is not known (see Navarre: *Essai sur la Rhetorique Grecque avant Aristote*, 213). The Greek term for *docilis* is *εὐμαθής* and means, according to Navarre, to be in a condition to understand, that is, to follow the explanation of the case. He says Latin renders the idea poorly by *docilis* and that French renders it worse by *docile*. The English *docile*, it might be added, is equally as bad, unless to it be given in this use a strictly technical sense.

The first author cited for the term is the writer of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (already quoted above on this page), ascribed by some to Anaximenes (it is printed among Aristotle's works). In Chapter 29 this writer says that *docilitas* is obtained by the 'clear and summary statement of the subject to those not acquainted with it, that they may know what the speech is about and may follow the question' (see Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* 1.214).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lysias*, Chapter 24), writes concerning the same function that, according

to the rhetoricians, 'the speakers should state their case concisely, that the judges may not be ignorant of the question and of what is to be said'. In the same chapter he explains the other functions of the exordium.

An anonymous writer in Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 7. 66, gives the following method of obtaining *docilitas*: γίνεται εύμαθεια όταν σαφώς παριστώμεν τὸ πρᾶγμα περὶ οὗ μέλλομεν ποιῆσθαι τὸν λόγον, i. e. '*docilitas* is produced whenever we clearly state the subject about which we are going to make our speech'.

Longinus, in Walz 9. 557, says: καὶ καταρχὰς μὲν ἐπαγγελίαν ἔχει καὶ μερισμὸν τῶν κεφαλαίων τὸ προοίμιον· καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπαγγελίαν ἔχει τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὸν δὲ μερισμὸν εύμαθείας ἕνεκα, 'At the beginning the exordium has an announcement and a division of the topics; it has the announcement for the sake of the proof and the division for the sake of *docilitas*'.

Compare also an anonymous writer in Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* 1. 428: εἰδότες γὰρ οἱ ἀκούοντες περὶ ὧν οἱ λόγοι εύμαθέστεροι γενήσονται. εύμαθειαν δὲ ποιεῖ προέκθεσις ἀνατίσσει μερισμὸς, 'Those who know what the speeches treat of are more *dociles*. Proposition, review, division produce *docilitas*'. The author goes on to define and illustrate the terms, giving an example of proposition and of division. The term *review* is strange in this connection, especially as the writer states that the proposition and the division belong in the beginning of the speech, but not the *review*, 'for there is no review (refreshing of the memory) of what has not been previously stated'. An obvious fact to be sure!

The Opinion of Aristotle.—It has not been generally recognized where Aristotle treats of *docilitas*. Cope, as will be seen presently, thinks Aristotle treats of it in a single sentence in his *Rhetoric*, in the middle of a discussion on *attentio*; he seems to overlook the fact that Aristotle treats exclusively of this function through two sections (3. 14. 5-6). Aristotle treats of the exordium in *Rhetoric* 3. 14. He divides the chapter into three parts: the exordium in demonstrative or epideictic oratory, 1-4, in judicial oratory, 5-11, in deliberative oratory, 12. He treats of the three well known functions of the exordium under judicial oratory. In 5-6 he discusses *docilitas*, in 7-11 the other functions'. The following is Jebb's translation of the principal portion of 5-6: "The introduction is an indication of the subject, in order that the hearers may know it beforehand, and that their thoughts may not be in suspense;—for the indefinite bewilders, so that he who puts the opening, as it were, into the hand of the listener, makes it immediately easy for him to follow the story".

¹ Aristotle approaches these three functions in the same spirit in which, in the preceding chapter (3. 13), he treated of the traditional parts of the speech. These were divided into essential (necessary) and non-essential. In the same way here, he divides the three traditional functions of the exordium into the essential or necessary one, *docilitas*, and the non-essential or remedial functions, *benevolentia* and *attentio*.

The first lines of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are cited as examples.

Aristotle does not call this a species of exordium, but rather ἀναγκαῖότατον ἔργον τοῦ προοιμίου, "most necessary function" (Cope); "essential task" (Jebb). This work done by the exordium is admitted to be and evidently is wholly intellectual.

How can it be shown that Aristotle is referring to *docilitas* in 5-6?

(a) By terminology. Practically the same terms are employed by Aristotle here that are used by Anaximenes and Dionysius where they treat of *docilitas*. I subjoin the pertinent passages from the three writers:

Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3. 14.5): δειγμα τοῦ λόγου ἵνα προῖ-
δωσι περὶ οὗ ἢ ὁ λόγος—ποιεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ—δηλῶσαι
οὗ ἕνεκα ὁ λόγος.

Anaximenes (*Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, Chapter 29): τοῦ πρᾶγματος ἐν κεφαλῇ (cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3. 14.9) μὴ εἰδῶσι δῆλως ἵνα γινώσκωσι περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, παρακολουθῶσι τε τῇ ὑπόθεσιν.

Dionysius (*Lysias*, Chapter 24): εἰς γε τὸ εύμαθεῖς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ποιῆσαι, κελύουσι συστρέψαντας εἰπεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἵνα μὴ ἀγνοῶσι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν οἱ δικάσται—δειγμα τοῦ πρᾶγματος.

(b) By testimony. Quintilian (4. 1.34), explaining how to obtain *docilitas*, gives as an example the opening lines of Homer, the very example that Aristotle uses in 5-6. Since Quintilian wrote with this chapter of Aristotle before him (he criticises some of Aristotle's statements), it would seem he understood Aristotle to be speaking of *docilitas*.

(c) By exclusion. There were before Aristotle's time three functions of the exordium. If the production of *docilitas* is not the "necessary task" discussed in 5-6, there must be a fourth function not heard of before or since. The gaining of *benevolentia* and the winning of *attentio* belong to the remedial tasks of the exordium, because not to have these qualities would constitute a defect in a judge. Every judge has the obligation to be unprejudiced and to be willing to attend to the evidence. He cannot, however, be expected to know the precise point or the division of the prosecution or of the defence. Hence to convey such information is in Aristotle's view essential; to produce the other qualities of *benevolentia* and *attentio* is not essential to the speech but arises from the defects of the hearers, as Aristotle explains in the chapter.

(d) By the meaning of *εύμαθεια* elsewhere. In Aristotle *Rhet.* 1. 6. 15 the term denotes a wholly intellectual quality in a place where the author is distinguishing moral, physical and intellectual qualities. In *Moralia Magna* 1. 5 the term is purely intellectual and is distinguished expressly from moral qualities.

The constituent elements of *εύμαθεια* are all intellectual as given in Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 7. 666:

² All three have been cited above in translations.

Μέρη εὐμαθείας τρία, ἀγγίσινα, μνήμη, ἀξίτης. Μνήμη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τήρησις ὧν ἐμαθέ τις· ἀξίτης δὲ ἡ ταχυτὴς τῆς διαβολῆς· ἀγγίσινα δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὧν ἐμαθέ τις & μὴ ἐμαθε θεωρεῖν.

Aristotle does not, it is true, make use of the stereotyped technical term in 5-6. There can, however, hardly be any doubt of his meaning. The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (Anax. I.c.) also omits the term, but since both authors mention the other two functions immediately and since the three functions were well known, the mere omission of the technical term does not affect our conclusion.

Had Cope (Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, 3. p. 171; Introduction, p. 340) noted that Aristotle was giving his doctrine on *docilitas* in 5-6, he would not have said that Aristotle includes *docilitas* under *attentio*. The two functions are connected, as will be seen presently, but they are distinct. What led Cope astray is a sentence in 7, a sentence to which Jebb has given a new version that keeps Aristotle consistent with himself and at one with all other rhetoricians. Cope indeed gives what has been the traditional version of the sentence in question, but Jebb's rendering is correct.

Here is the sentence: εἰς δὲ εὐμάθειαν πάντα ἀνάγει, ἐάν τις βούληται καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲ φαίνεσθαι. προσέχουσι γὰρ μᾶλλον τοῦτοις.

Cope, *Rhetoric* 3. p. 172, translates thus: "(εὐμάθεια, *docilitas*, need not be made a separate topic, because) any speaker may refer to this (carry back, i. e. apply) anything he pleases (any of the topics of the *προόμιον*), even the appearance of respectability and worth; for to these (τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι) the audience is always more inclined to attend".

Jebb, *Rhetoric of Aristotle*, p. 183, renders as follows: "The whole art of the proem may be summed up in this, if you like, making the hearers docile and making yourself seem estimable, for estimable people are heard with more attention".

Cope's interpretation supposes *docilitas* in the passage to be an effect; whereas it is rather a cause of which *attentio* is the effect. The phrase ἀνάγειν εἰς is used often by Aristotle to refer back to a cause. In the *Rhetoric* (1. 4. 3) we have the phrase, and this is the way Cope interprets it: "But it is plain that advice is confined to those things which we deliberate about; and these are all such as may be referred to ourselves as authors or agents (ἀναγείσθαι εἰς ἑμᾶς) or of which the origin of generation (i. e. of bringing about or effecting) is in our own power" (Intro. to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, p. 173). Other instances of the same phrase, always with the same meaning 'to refer back to as to a cause', may be found in *Nic. Eth.* 3. 3. 17; 3. 5. 6; 3. 9. 7. In this particular passage there is a contrast with the sentence preceding, where we have εἰς γέλωτα προάγειν. As ἀνά is contrasted here with πρό, its meaning would naturally be 'back to'. Now we would not say 'refer back to an effect'. The preceding sentence denotes motion forward to an effect and so this sentence by contrast will denote motion back to a cause. Further, Cope's interpretation implies that Aristotle is in this sentence taking *docilitas* for separate discussion, but the parallelism with

the preceding sentence would in that case be lost sight of, and other violence would be done to the context. The question Aristotle is considering is whether *attentio* in as far as it is derived from the person of the hearer can be dispensed with. 'Many', he says, 'strive to provoke people to a laugh in order to make them inattentive'. 'No', replies Aristotle, 'don't distract your audience by a joke but bring them back to a full grasp of the subject and to an appreciation of your personal worth, and you will rather have their attention'. The emphatic position of εὐμάθειαν delicately suggests the contrast with γέλωτα, and the μᾶλλον in the last clause of the sentence enforces it. This last clause, 'for they pay attention rather to these', shows that Aristotle is still treating of *attentio* as a principal topic. Cope says the meaning is, "*docilitas* need not be made a separate topic". In that case Aristotle would have said: 'Employ such and such means, for thus you will have *docilitas*'. But, on the contrary, he says employ such and such means and thus you will have *attentio*. This would seem to prove that the meaning, therefore, is rather that *attentio* from the person of the hearer need not be made a separate topic. This harmonizes with what follows, where Aristotle explains how *attentio* may be drawn from the importance, utility, novelty, and attractiveness of the *subject matter*.

Cope makes πάντα the cause of εὐμάθεια, but, as has been shown, 'anything' is rather the effect, as in Jebb's version, where the words mean: 'by making your hearers docile and by seeming worthy you do everything—to these two causes you may refer the whole effect called for here'.

Grammatically, again, Jebb's version is sound. The articular infinitive, which in Cope's translation is put in the same construction with πάντα, is in Jebb's version put in the same construction with εὐμάθειαν and made dependent upon εἰς. There is no solid reasoning against such a course, and Jebb's version has the merit of avoiding all the difficulties urged against Cope's, while it keeps Aristotle consistent with himself and all other rhetoricians.

(2) *The Latin Rhetoricians*.—Cicero gives the fullest explanation of *docilitas* in *Orat.* Part. 8. The functions of the exordium, he says, are three: *ut amice, ut intellegenter, ut attente audiamur*. Here Cicero avoids the word *docilis*, and uses *intellegenter*. *Amice* corresponds to *benevolentia*, and *attente* to *attentio*. After explaining how the first end, good will, is obtained, especially by good character, he continues: *intellegenter autem ut audiamur et attente a rebus ipsis ordiendum est. Sed facillime auditor discit et quid agatur intellegit si complectare a principio genus naturamque causae, si definias, si divides, si neque prudentiam eius impediās confusione partium nec memoriam multitudinis; quaeque mox de narratione dilucida dicentur, eadem etiam huc poterunt recte referri*. Note that *facillime discit* is a close rendering of the Greek term, and mark the means made use of, all intellectual.

Quintilian speaks of *docilitas* in 4. 1. 34: Docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat attentio; sed et illud, si breviter et dilucide summam rei, de qua cognoscere debeat, iudicaverimus, quod Homerus atque Vergilius operum suorum principiis faciunt. Nam is eius rei modus est, ut propositioni similior sit quam expositioni; nec quomodo quidque sit actum sed de quibus dicturus sit ostendat. Nec video, quod huius rei possit apud oratores reperiri melius exemplum quam Ciceronis pro A. Cluentio. He then cites the opening sentence of that speech.

The intellectual nature of *docilitas* in Latin rhetoricians is proved (a) from the words used in defining it; (b) from the causes which are proposed to obtain it, which are e.g. proposition, definition, division, causes that formally and directly produce an effect upon the mind; (c) from the kind of cases in which *docilitas* is to be the chief, if not the only, function of the exordium. Cicero De Invent. 1. 15 and Quintilian 4. 1. 40 give five kinds of cases; Cicero declares that *docilitas* should be the chief function of the exordium in the *genus obscurum* in quo tardi auditores sunt aut difficilioribus ad cognoscendum negotiis causa implicita est. *Docilitas*, therefore, is to be produced where there are intellectual difficulties to be contended with, either on the part of the audience or on the part of the subject.

(3) *More Recent Rhetoricians.*—Victorinus, in his commentary on Cicero's De Inventionem, says of the introduction of that work: Hic Cicero fecit dociles auditores, cum, quid sit eloquentia, ostendit; attentos, cum dicit se de eloquentia dicturum, re scilicet magna; benevolos quidem, quia ostendit futurum commodum (Capperonierus, Antiqui Rhetores Latini, 102). Deinde ostendit quo pacto dociles auditores facere debeamus; si, inquit, in principiis ea quae sunt nobis dicenda, ponamus ut nobis iudices ad cognoscendum negotium comparemus (ibid. p. 145).

Isidorus, De Arte Rhetorica, writes: Benevolum precando, docilem instruendo, attentum excitando facimus (ibid. p. 388). Alcuin, be it noted, repeats Quintilian (ibid. p. 397). Martianus Capella says: Docilem facimus si de causa aliquid strictum quo instruamus iudicem proferatur (ibid. p. 432).

Modern rhetoricians in France as well as in Italy follow Cicero and Quintilian almost without exception, so far as we have been able to examine. They often use Cicero's very words, as De Inventionem 1. 16 Dociles auditores faciemus, si aperte et breviter summam causae exponemus, hoc est, in quo consistat controversia. Here 'clearness, brevity, exposition of the point at issue' are all indications that a purely intellectual effect is aimed at.

Relation of the three functions to one another: With *benevolentia* a man listens willingly as to a friend; with *attentio* he listens attentively as one interested; with *docilitas* he listens intelligently as

one informed of the subject under discussion. Cicero expresses the function by the three adverbs *amice*, *attente*, *intelligenter*. I may have one without the other two. I may be a friend of an orator without necessarily being interested in his subject or being prepared to follow the discussion of it. I may be interested in the subject and not be friendly disposed to the speaker. Take the subject, Abraham Lincoln, to Georgia, and it might not interest, perhaps not even if H. W. Grady spoke on it. Take the subject to Illinois and let an orator enthusiastically admired speak on it, there will be good will and interest; but let the orator take an obscure proposition or involved division or a confused or mysterious aspect of the question and there will be no *docilitas*.

Yet these three functions, though distinct, can and often do help one another. My interest in a subject and my understanding of it are conditioned by my will to listen. My will to listen may depend upon the way the subject is handled and presented to me. The astronomers of to-day are most willing to know all about Mars and its canals and many are engrossed in its contemplation, but, since it is difficult to get the proper light and distance, they are still in doubt on the subject. They are *benevoli* and *attenti*. The man who will discover a better telescope and bring the subject within the field of accurate vision will make them *dociles*. This application of the terms to the eyes may help to understand their application to the mind.

If the mutual dependence and connection of the three functions be remembered, it will not be hard to explain why one function helps to produce the effect of another function. Aristotle, as has been seen, says that *attentio* may be had under certain circumstances by the help of the other functions. Auctor ad Herenn. (1. 4. 7) says *attentio* helps to *docilitas*: docilis est qui attente vult audire. Cicero (De Inv. 1. 15) makes a similar statement. Quintilian too (4. 1. 34) says, Docilem sine dubio et haec ipsa praestat attentio. These are all indications of the close connection of these three functions operating on the same hearer. All these statements, however, are, like Aristotle's, incidental remarks because, when these writers explain the functions, the terms they use, the examples they give, the means they advise all go to show the distinction between the three tasks of the exordium and that *docilitas* denotes a purely intellectual preparation of the audience, a mental outlook on the topic of the speech and on its proposed treatment, the furnishing of a traveller's map or brief guide book to those who are to journey with the orator. If, then, with that the listeners are willing to go along (*benevoli*) and are deeply interested in the country promised them (*attenti*), the speaker may hope to be successful in reaching the destined goal, persuasion.

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July 8—August 16, 1912

GREEK—Elementary Course—Professor Macurdy, 10:30.
Homer, Iliad, four books—Dr. Sturtevant, 10:30.
Plato, Phaedo; Republic X—

Professor Macurdy, 11:30.

LATIN—Elementary Course—Miss Wye, 8:30.

—Reading, Oral Practice—

Miss Wye, 2:30.

Prose Composition—Secondary School Course—

Miss Wye, 1:30.

Livy, XXI, XXII—Dr. Sturtevant, 1:30.

Horace, Odes und Epodes—

Professor Moore, 11:30.

Prose Composition—College Course—

Professor Knapp, 10:30.

Cicero, Selected Orations—

Professor Knapp, 11:30.

Prose Composition—Advanced Course—

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